In the wake of the mortgage meltdown, many pundits are calling for more regulation of the lending industry. But a better approach would be based on economist Adam Smith’s concept of the Invisible Hand. In his 1776 magnum opus, The Wealth of Nations, Smith described the ability of a free market to correct for seemingly disastrous situations with little government intervention. In other words, the market will correct itself when left unfettered.
While painful, the recent housing crisis could provide an important lesson: an unregulated market allows individuals and companies to learn from their mistakes and apply a deeper and more disciplined approach to financial matters. Instead of creating an entitlement system whereby homeownership is granted to everyone simply for participating, we could use the lessons from the mortgage meltdown to reestablish a strong system of meritocracy, which is the only way to sustain a high quality of life in the face of increasingly competitive global markets.
Some media outlets and the general public are pointing to the mortgage meltdown as evidence of the free market’s pitfalls, saying that more regulatory measures are necessary to prevent future bubbles. But regulations are at least in part responsible for the meltdown.
Let’s take a look at two examples:
1. Not content to let the market sort itself after the dot-com catastrophe, the Feds made it cheaper and cheaper to borrow money in hopes that they could stave off the worst of the bubble burst. The easier and cheaper it was for banks to borrow money from the government (the federal funds rate was as low as 1 percent), the easier and cheaper it was for lenders to loan money. The easier and cheaper it was to borrow, the more buyers appeared in the market. More dollars competing for the same homes equaled asset inflation.
2. Augmenting matters, the government implemented and facilitated programs to make it easier for low-income borrowers and people with poor credit scores to buy homes. Considering very high homeownership part of its responsibility, the government created initiatives that allowed almost anyone to own a home without having to work as hard as previous generations to purchase it. Banks were (and still are) subject to the Community Reinvestment Act, which requires banks to extend credit to underserved populations. This initiative purports to make homeownership affordable to low-income populations. In other words, it forces banks to make loans available to people who cannot always afford them.
Making matters more confusing, the long-arm of the government extends to touch Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, government-sponsored entities that are vital to market liquidity and the homeownership process. These hybrid entities are both public and private, which means they must compete in a capitalist system while still adhering to governmental bureaucracy. So when Congress ordered Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to provide loans to previously underserved borrowers, they had no choice but to extend trillions of dollars of loans to people who would have not qualified otherwise.
The government even went so far as to guarantee some of the loans, which meant lenders faced less risk and were increasingly willing to lend money to otherwise-unqualified borrowers. Because the buyers were often exempted from down payment requirements, they faced little risk and were willing to finance increasingly expensive homes. Again, more dollars competing for the same inventory of homes translated into asset inflation.
These government interventions contributed to a cyclical craze whereby prices inflated drastically, which meant more borrowers entered the market, which drove prices even higher.
This wild asset inflation led to an additional problem: speculation. With housing prices rising rapidly, investors wanted to enter the action, contributing their own dollars to the competition and further driving up prices.
With prices rising so quickly, lenders perceived little risk: if the buyer ultimately cannot afford his mortgage, he can just sell it for a profit, thought the lender. Lenders made increasingly risky loans. Buyers, too, perceived little risk, and they applied for loans that far exceeded their budgets.
This is how the bubble was created. And when it burst, it was a giant explosion: not only did asset inflation skyrocket so severely that even the most brash lenders and buyers were no longer willing to get involved, but at the same time, all those people who could not afford their loans stopped making payments, putting their homes on the market, only to discover their homes were priced too high to sell.
Had the government applied true laissez-faire capitalist ideals, the Invisible Hand would have created a system of checks and balances. Afraid of losing money by lending to unqualified borrowers, lenders would have created strict guidelines to prevent low-income borrowers and people with poor credit histories from obtaining loans they could not or would not pay back. And borrowers, required to make down payments, would have been cautious about their investments.
Some people want government to create more regulation in an attempt to solve the very problem to which it contributed. But the best role for the government is to police and enforce existing laws, not to create unnecessary and addition layers of regulation. We seem to have forgotten this: while the government adds more and more costly regulations, the FBI is under-resourced to investigate real estate and mortgage fraud that is still growing and unfolding before their eyes!
Subsequent programs to regulate lenders and bail out borrowers will only succeed in keeping affordable housing out of the reach of potential homebuyers. In the meantime, many deserving borrowers will continue to suffer through this crisis. Other borrowers will simply walk away from their obligations, leaving banks and lenders with little or no recourse.
The “meltdown” is not an example of the free market’s failure. It is the Invisible Hand’s way of restoring balance in the wake of unnecessary government regulation. And if the government lets the Invisible Hand handle the process, prices will fall to a level that the market determines is affordable, and lenders will start to see property values stabilize or rise. Eager to protect their principal and learn from their mistakes, they will make more rational lending decisions, such as requiring a down payment to ensure that borrowers can actually afford the mortgages they take on.
And the government can focus on its job: enforcing the existing laws to protect borrowers and businesses from fraud and other criminal behavior.
Paul Wylie
Please visit http://www.paulwylie.com